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Neoclassical labor economics: its implications for
labor and employment law
Michael L. Wa chter 1

The applica ti on of economics to la bor and employment law tra il s it s app licat io n in virtually all o ther areas of business a nd commercial law. Topics such as co ntracts , tort s,
corpora ti o ns, commercial law, and ta x have all readil y integrated economic reasoning as
an ass ist to lega l reaso ning. In alm ost all these cases. m oreover. the economics concept
of efficiency has been acce pted as one of the goals of the law. This is decidedly not the
case in labor law or, for the most part, in empl oyment law.c D isagreement over fundamen tal principles serves as an important explanation fo r thi s relative lack of emphas is on
.
.
econom1c reaso nmg.
M ost labor law schola rs believe deeply that collective bargaining is the preferred
framework for the empl oyment rel ati on ship .3 They tend to share the o rigina l goal of the
National Labor Rela ti on s Act (NLRA) , which remains o n the book s toda y, of eq ualizin g bargaining power by ena bling workers to engage in co llective bargaining with
their employers. The NLRA's goal of equ alizing bargaining power e nco mpassed bo th
procedural and substa nti ve ends: it sought to prom o te the m echan ism of collective bargaining and , in d o ing so, to raise 1mges above th e market 1mge th a t would prevail absent
uni o nizat ion.
Achieving bo th procedural and substanti ve ends simultaneo usly turned o ut to be the
cha llenge. As unio ns helped workers gain a wage premium. unio nized firm s became less
competitive and nonunion firms fought harder to sta y no nuni on. Modern neoclass ical econo mic theory offered a simple explanatio n ba sed on the m ost ba sic principle o f
eco no mics . The inverse relatio nship between qu a ntit y (i.e ., empl oym ent) and price (i.e.,
wage), works in the labo r market as in every other market. If unions succeed in raising
wages above competitive levels by using the eco nomic weapo ns available to them in collective ba rgai ning, uni o n empl oyment is likely to suffer. The res ult is a tradeoff betwee n
the number of wo rkers covered by collective ba rga ining ag reements and the size of the
uni o n wage premium. A s a consequence there is a n inco nsistency within this goal of the
N LR A.
Several a ttempt s have been made to formulate a lternati ve the o rie s that era se thi s
dismal tra deo ff betwee n the size of the unio nized wo rkforce and the uni on wage
p remium in order to res uscit ate the twin goals of hi gh union empl oyment and a higher
uni on wage. M ost varia nts a re built around the efficiency model. Workers are no t lik e
o ther co mm odities or inp uts in that they can respond to incenti ves. Perhaps higher wages
cou ld call forth greater coo peration and higher productivity. To date, howe ver, this line
o r research bas no t been successful in res uscita tin g the normative ap pea l for the union
sector because its ass umptio ns only hold for the no nunion secto r.
Research has mo ved beyo nd this thresh o ld issue to o ther labor m arke t issues, particu la rl y th ose ar isin g in the internal labo r market , or, in other words, the employment
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relationship that exists inside the firm. Here workers are less mobile and the firm is less
constrained b y market force s. Conseq uently, th ere is at least potentially greater room for
policy intervention that would im prove the protectio n accorded to workers. Even here ,
however, econo mic theory which emphasizes the transaction costs of collective bargaining otTers more caveats than encouragement. The lack of integration of economics into
labor and employment law is thus not surprising at a ll. If one's agenda is to promote
collective bargaining or provide more procedural right s to nonunion employees,
neoclassical economics is no t a promising starting po int.
The task of this chapter is to analyze the tradeoff between wages and employment and
to eval ua te other policies and policy prescriptions in th e context of a neoclassical m odel
of the labo r market . That model is diffe rent from the simplified textbook portrayal.
Yet it is not new, as its ba sic building blocks have been availab le for several decades.
For example , portions of this chapter are drawn from two articles that I co-authored
(Wachter and Wright, 1990; Rock a nd Wachter, 1996), citing to the original articles that
developed the co ncepts.
The chapter is organized in the following sections. Section I describes the foundations
of the neoclassical model. starting with the textbook model o f the union and nonunion
labor markets . These are the external labor market s (ELM) where workers seek jobs
and empl oyers fill vacancies. Thi s section presents the core issue; namely the tradeoff
between union wages and union employment. It then explores the fundamental theo rems of we lfare economics that allow us to attach we lfare implications to alternative
market o utcomes and investigates the various theoretical attempts to refute the existence
of the tradeoff between unio n wages and employment. Section II develops the model
of the internal labor markets (ILM), which represents th e employment re lationsh ip
inside the firm. It also prese nts the connecti ons between the ILM and the ELM and
presents the four central economic factors in the ILM ; namely job-specific training, risk
a version, information asymmetries and transaction costs. Sections III and IV discuss
how the parties deal with the four factor s of the ILM either thro ugh union contracting
(Sect ion III) or nonunion contracting or norm s (Section IV) . The last section, Section V,
concludes the chapter and discusses policy implications.

I.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL

A.

Textbook Model of a Competitive Labor Market

I start with the simple competitive equilibrium textbook model of the labor market
(see Figure 2.1). Although simple, it is all that is needed to engage much of the debate.
This is the external labor market (ELM), where firm s hire workers into new jobs and
un em ployed workers search for jo bs after an existing job turnover or a n entry into the
labor market. The key prediction is that wages are determined by market forces, labor
suppl y (denoted by S), and labor demand (denoted by D). Market-equilibrating forces
lead the labor market toward the equilibrium so lu tion. where S and D intersect. wit h
employme nt at Ec and the wage at W c At thi s point wages cannot be higher without
employment being lower. The equilibrium point is thu s efficient 4
Suppose. however, that the labor market were out o f equi lib rium. with a low wage of
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W L (where the subscript L denotes the low wage) . At this low wage level, demand for
la bo r (DL) wo uld be far in excess o f the suppl y of labor (SL). Since labor market s are
competitive, empl oye rs would offer higher wages to compete for wo rkers in o rder to fill
the high demand for la bor. Wages wo uld rise to ward W C' and the la bor suppl y would
increase as mo re individuals joined the labor force seeking jo bs a t the higher wage levels.
At the same time, labo r demand would begin to decline beca use the higher pay of the
work force wo uld mean that workers were less profitable. Thus the eq uilibrating process
wo uld conti nue until the wage had increased from W L to W c and demand had decl ined
from DL to the competitive equilibrium level of empl oyment (den o ted by Ec )·
A ltern ati vely, supp ose the labor market we re o ut of equilibrium with a high wage of
W w At this point la bo r demand wo uld be at DH. which would be much lower than the
suppl y SH. Market-equilibrating forces wo uld again come into opera ti o n. Now workers
would co mpete for the jobs at the high wage rate . As a consequence of the lab or co mpetition. the wage rate wo uld begin to decline. As the wage declined, empl oyme nt wo uld
begin to pick up, reflecting the lower wage ra te . The process would continue until the
wage had declined to W c and emplo ym ent had increased to Ec
The above discussion oflab o r sup ply and dem and presents a partial equilibrium view .
Labor suppl y and demand functi ons fit into a st ructural m odel of the overall eco nom y.
In the structural model, wage effec ts ripple thro ugh other markets and in turn feed back
to influence the location of the labor suppl y and demand curve .
The labor demand curve discu ssed above is referred to as a deri ved dem and becau se
it is derived from the demand for the firm's product s. The location of the demand cur ve
depends on the productivity and skill of workers in producing the product or service that
the employer is selling in the market. The greater the productivity of worker s, the greater
is the eq uilibrium wage . D emand curves slope downwa rd because of substituti on effec ts
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a nd diminishing ret urn s as co nsumers switch away fr om expe nsive prod ucts and em pl oyers sub stitute inexpensive factor s of prod uction fo r ex pensive factors. At thi s leve l of
abstraction the diagram refers to the ove rall labor market; however it can be generalized
to a ny number of different skill levels an d geographical regions. This discussion ass umes
the existence of competitive la bor ma rkets.
The suppl y curve 's loca ti on depend s on the wo rk/leisu re choice made by individuals.
Supply curves are ge nera ll y viewed as being upward sloping; th at is, more indiv iduals
enter the labor market in sea rch of jobs when the wage is high . H owever. wherea s the
demand curve is always downward sloping, the suppl y curve need not always be upward
sloping. For the purpo ses of thi s chapter. I ass ume th e labor suppl y is upward sloping,
but no thing of importance in the chapter turn s on this assumption.
It is the existence of an inverse relations hip between wages and empl oy men t that is at
the hea rt of the debate . There a re so me cha nges in the econo my, such as an ex pansionary m oneta ry and fi scal p olicy in the midst of a recession, th at ca n allow employment
to increase even as wages are increased. But changes of thi s type a re not con tested . The
debatable iss ue is a very speciftc o ne . namely whether an exoge nou s increase in union
wages above the market-cl ea rin g wage, as a res ult o f co llective bargaining, will h ave a
negative effect o n union empl oy ment. D eco nstructing the wage/e mplo ym ent tradeo ff
thu s becomes critical for trad itio nal labor sch o lars w ho wa nt to und o the claim tha t
higher union wages are in versely related to union empl oyment levels. 5
In this cha pter I assume, as do most other economists, that ex ternal labor markets
in the nonuni on sector a re gene rall y highl y competitive. I d o n o t ass ume that product
markets a re necessarily competitive nor do I a ss ume th a t internal labor marke ts are
perfectl y co mpetitive . Alth ough the tex tbook m odel a bove ass umes perfect competitio n, perfectio n is not needed for the efficiency and we lfa re co nclusio ns to ho ld.
Labor markets that are hi ghl y compe titive, but not perfectly so. ca n ha ve fricti on s a nd
info rm atio n gaps a t a ny point in time, and ca n be in disequilibrium in the short run .
None of th e policy co nclusio ns is changed by acknowledging these short-run m arket
imperfections.
The mode l I use here, the neocla ss ica l theo ry, is the standa rd model used in economic
ana lysis. It can be criticized for igno ring ma ny instituti onal feat ures o f the labor market ,
but its goa l is tes table predictio ns. A nd that it does with excellence. Wages d o ge nerally
ri se a t a fas ter rate during expansio ns a nd decrea se or rise a t a slowe r rate durin g recessions. M ore skilled wo rkers will genera ll y have higher wages th a n less skilled workers.
Growing regio ns will tend to have fa ster wage growth than declining regions. There are
di sc repa ncies, of course, because no theo ry is perfect. but the overall predictive picture is
stro ng. Moreover~ and thi s is key- there is no a lte rn at ive theory which o ffers a similar
range of predictio ns. Ce rt ai nl y th ere are many va ri ant s of the neoclassical m odel, but al l
sha re the assumption that prices and q ua ntities are determ ined in markets by press ures
of suppl y and demand . Moreover, whenever markets are ou t of equilibr ium , there are
eq uilibra tin g force s that push the ma rket toward equili brium . The equilibra ti on is not
in sta ntan eo us and it can even tak e years to recalibrate, as was th e case in the earl y 20th
century, where workers fr om the so uthern regions of the U nited States moved north in
searc h of newly crea ted m an ufact uring jobs.
Anot her key co mponent of the neoclassical m odel consists of th e fundamental genera l
eq uilibrium theo rems. The fir st fundamen ta l theorem, stated in its m ost sim ple fo rm .
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says th a t competitive markets are efficient because they maximize the total income that
the economy can produce. 6 The second fundamental theo rem, again in its simplest form,
is that there are many different income-maximizing states, each corresponding to a different distribution of income across individual s. 7 The government, through tax and expe nditure policies, is given the job of choo sing am o ng the alternative income-maximizing
states to determine the welfare-maximizing income distributio n . The policy implicati o n
drawn fr om these theorems is that policymakers should fir st attempt to make markets
as competitive as possible, and then should seek to impro ve income distribution to reac h
the optimal distribution of income o r we lfare.
A number of interesting. a lbeit highl y stylized , policy implications can be drawn from
the above description of the labo r m ark et. First, there is no need for government policy
(or for unions) to ensure that wages rise over time with worker productivity. Competitive
market s will lead to th a t result. Instead , if unions ra ise wages above competitive level s,
the economy will be less productive. Second, when changes in the income distributio n
are deemed desirable, they should genera ll y be ac hieved through ta x and government
expenditure program s rather than by dictating noncompetitive outcomes in markets
thro ugh government regulation. Industrial policy sho uld be confined to making market s
as competitive as possible. 8 Thu s po licies that improve the efficiency of particular labo r
ma rkets are generally fa vo red in neoclassical economics.
Alth o ugh no one believes tha t markets are perfectly efficient , the neoclassical tex tboo k model a ss umes that markets are perfectly competitive as a simplifying assumption
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 20 11 ) and as an ideal against which policy improvements can be
judged. N otably, over the last seve ral decades neoclassical models have incorporated
job-search frictions, job-specific training, information asymmetries. and other market
realities that might a llow fo r po licy improve ment s.
The neoclassical model has a lso been extended to account for monopso ny, in which
one firm can exercise labor market po we r. ~ Unlike in the competiti ve labor market , in
which firm s are ''wage takers'' when they hire workers, in the monopsony model the firm
is a wage setter. It need s to raise it s wage if it wants to increase hiring and can lower its
wage when it is reducing employment . I will not illu strate this mo del o r discuss it in a ny
detail , however, becau se there is little evidence of material mono psony power in U.S.
labo r markets so that whatever mono psony power exists is unlikel y to change any o f the
conclu sions reached in this chapter. If monopsony were dominant in the labo r market,
higher uni on wages could lead to higher employment.
Labor markets tend to be mo re competitive than product markets. The rea son is that
employers , regardless of their product market, still hire workers from the same externa l
labo r market. Pro spective workers ha ve no firm- specific tra ining and their skill le vel
depends mainly o n their le ve l of education and general training, whether they are high
schoo l graduates, co llege graduates. or professional schoo l graduates. If employers are
hiring locally, then each would hire blue-co llar wo rkers from the sam e high schoo ls and
entry-level engineers o r managers from the same colleges. In o ther wo rd s, even if labo r
markets were entirely loca l, they wou ld be more competitive than the loca l product
markets. However, labor markets are no t local. While wo rkers incur costs in moving
from o ne locality to another in sea rch o fjob s, in today's society la bo r markets are m o re
nati o na l than local.
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says that competitive markets are efficient beca use they maximize the total income that
th e economy can produce. 6 The second fundamenta l theore m, again in its simplest form,
is that there are ma ny different income-maximizing states. each corresponding to a diffe ren t distribution of inco me across individual s. 7 The government, thr o ugh tax and expe nditure policies, is given the job of choosing among the alternative incom e-maximizing
sta tes to determine the welfare-maximizing income distribution. The policy implication
drawn from these theorems is tha t policymakers should first attempt to make marke ts
as competiti ve as possible, and then shoul d seek to impro ve income distribution to reach
the optimal di stributi on of income or welfare .
A number of interesting, albeit highly stylized. policy implications can be drawn from
the above descripti on of the labor market. First , there is no need for government policy
(o r for unions) to ensure that wages rise over time with worker productivity. Competitive
marke ts will lead to that result. Instead, if uni ons rai se wages above co mpetiti ve levels,
the eco nomy will be less productive . Second, when changes in the inco me di stributi o n
are deemed desira ble. they should generally be achieved through tax and gove rnment
expenditure programs rather than by dictating noncompetitive o utco mes in markets
through government regulation . Industrial policy sho uld be confined to making ma rkets
as com petitive as possible. 8 Thus policies th at impro ve the efficiency o f pa rticular la bor
marke ts are generally favored in neoclassical eco nomics.
Although no o ne believes that markets are perfectl y efficient, the neoclassical tex tbook m odel assum es that ma rkets are perfectly co mpetiti ve as a simplifying ass umpti o n
(Ehrenberg a nd Smith , 2011) a nd as an idea l against which policy improvements can be
judged . Notab ly, ove r the last several decades neoclass ical model s have incorpora ted
jo b- sea rch fricti o ns, job-specific training, info rmation asy mmetries. a nd other market
rea lities that might a llow for policy improve ments.
The neoclassica l model has a lso been exte nded to acco unt for m o nop so ny, in which
one firm can exercise labor ma rket power. Y U nlike in the co mpetiti ve labor ma rket, in
which firms are "wage takers" when they hire workers, in th e monopso ny model the firm
is a wage setter. It needs to rai se its wage if it wants to increase hiring and can lower its
wage when it is reducing employment. I wi ll no t illustra te thi s model o r di scuss it in any
deta il , however, because there is little evidence of ma terial monopso ny power in U.S.
labor markets so th a t whatever monopson y powe r exists is unlikely to change any of the
co nclusions reached in this chapter. If mon opso ny were dominant in the labor market ,
higher union wages co uld lead to higher employment.
La bo r markets tend to be m ore competitive than product markets. The reaso n is that
employers, rega rdless o f their product market. still hire wo rkers from the sa me external
labo r market. Prospective workers have no firm- specific training a nd their skill level
depends mainly on their level of education and general training, whether they are high
school graduates, college graduates, or profess io nal schoo l graduates. If employers are
hiring locally, then eac h would hire blue-collar workers from the same high sc hools a nd
entry-level engineers or managers from the same colleges. In other word s, even if labo r
markets were entirely local, they would be more competitive than the local product
ma rkets. H owever , labo r ma rkets are no t local. While wo rkers incur costs in m oving
fr o m o ne loca lit y to a not her in sea rch ofj obs, in toda y's society la bo r markets are more
na ti onal th a n loca l.
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Textbook Model of a Union Labor Market

The primary goal of labor uni ons is to '· take wages out of co mpetition. " Labor is not
just anot her co mmodit y and. in this line of reasoning, workers should not be treated as
a commodity and have their pay determined by market forces. A key question for labor
eco nomics is wha t conseq uences will follow uni on efforts to rai se wages ab ove what the
market would otherwise dictate.
The textbook uni on labor market uses a sim ple va riant of the supply and demand
model used in Figure 2. 1. Figure 2.2 starts by dup licating the wage and employment
levels th at exist in a competiti ve market. As noted above, the equilibrating forces of
co mpetitive markets pu sh the labor market toward the intersection of the S and D
curves. The union market works very differently beca use the eq uilibrating market forces
are rep laced by the collective bargaining mechanism . The wage set through collective
bargaining, denoted W u• is higher than the market-clea ring, or competitive, wage, Wc
With its legally protected strike weapon, the uni on can extract a wage premium from
employers in return for not strikin g.
As a result of the higher union wage, firm s set labor dema nd at D u. The societal cost
of the union wage being higher than the competitive wage is a lower level of employment
(E L. rather than Ec) . Furthermore. at the higher uni on wage, not onl y does the number
of jobs decrease, but the number of workers seeking th ose jobs increases. The res ult
is unemployment. measured by the horizontal distance a t W u between the suppl y of
workers to the union sector, Su, compared to labor demand , D u. Without the eq uilibrating force of competitive markets the resulting social loss of reduced output and higher
unemployment can persist in the uni on labor market. 10
The uni on labor market is sometimes referred to as a cartelized market in that the
union as the agent of the wo rkers allows labor (workers or suppliers of labor) to act in
Wage
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co ncert so that the wage is set above competiti ve leve ls (Posner, 1984 ; W achter, C hap ter
15 in this vo lume). From an eco nomics van tage point, there is no thing con troversial
abo u t calling the unio nized labor market a ca rtelized market. The use of the term sim ply
fit s the eco nomic definition of a cartel. Since cart els in product markets, however, are
generally viewed nega tively, the term cartel may have acq uired nega tive connotations.
Its use here, howeve r. is entirely de scrip tive . Ca rtels seek to take prices. or in thi s case
wages, o ut of competi tion, a nd that is perhaps the best single sen tence sta ting uni ons'
broad economic goal. 11
The problem for the union sector is to maintain the cartel and prevent the equilibrating market forces from operating. This was a more likely event under the original
Wagner Act, wh ich favo red unionizationlc A fter the Taft-Hartley Ac t was passed it
became easier fo r nonunion firms to form , remain nonun io n, a nd thu s compete. using
their lower labor cost structure, with the unionized firms. The re sult was the growth of
nonuni on sectors in virtually all United States product ma rkets. The emergence of international co mpe titio n has only worsened an a lready bad situation for unions (Wachter,
Chapter l 5 in th is volume). 13
In terms of F igure 2.2, thi s shift of work from the union sector to the nonunion secto r
mean s tha t the labo r demand curve shifts grad ually to the left over time, res ulting in
steadily declinin g union employment . The union firm can either lowe r its product price
to the no nunio n price (to the detriment of profits) or try to maintai n a price premium to
cover the uni on wage. In either case, the uni on firm is likel y to cut employment as it loses
market share. Where the competition is greates t, the unionized fim1 is unlikely to ea rn a
competitive return o n its capital so that it is unlikely to continue to invest in updating it s
ca pital eq uipment in its high cost plants. As its capital becomes obsolete, the pla nts' production becomes unco mpetitive so that output falls , causing a continuing erosio n in unio n
em ploy ment (Linneman , Wachter, and Carter, 1990; Hirsch, C hapter 4 in thi s vo lume).
Un ion wage se ttin g in the la bor market d oes not repeal product ma rket press ures:
wages are no t act ually taken out of competition in competitive prod uct markets. The
ex tent of the uni o n wage premium, which is the percentage difference betwee n W c and
W C' will affect the fortunes of the firm , and if there are non unio n firm s in the same
product mark et, the uni o n firm will be disadvantaged. That is invaria bl y the case today:
there a re esse ntia ll y no product markets that lack a non uni on sec tor.
One o f the explicit goals of the Wagner Act was to equalize barga ining powe r. As
Wac hter (Chapter 15 in thi s vo lume) po ints o ut, the substantive element of that goal
was to push the co llec tive ly bargained wage higher than the market wage. If the Wagner
Act had a lso succeeded in the procedural ele me nt of that goal of spreadin g uni onizatio n
thr o ughout the eco nomy, then the general equilibrium res ult of uni onizati on wo uld be
not o nly to raise wages through out the econo my, but also to generate unempl oyment.
The res ult s wo uld be akin to tho se show n in Figure 2.2.
The fr amers of the Wagner Act did not a nticipa te that the goa l of raisi ng wages
a bove ma rk et levels and increasing uni on employment at the same time wo uld prove
to be inconsistent. The neoclassical economic model was not developed eno ugh during
the 1930s for it to be a useful policy tool. The three components of the th eory not
ava ilable to comme nt a tors in the 1930s were, first , a partia l eq uilibrium th eo ry of the
labor ma rket: seco nd. a genera l equilibrium theory that pointed out the efficiency ga ins
achieved by compet itive outcomes; and third , a business cycle model.
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The partial equilibrium theory of the labo r market, which pos it s that lab o r demand
moves inve rsely with the wage rate, was first sketched o ut by M a rshall (1 890) 14 at the
turn of the last century, but its complete stat ement awa ited the wo rk of Sir J o hn Hicks.
Alt ho ugh Hick s· b oo k was published in 1932, 15 Hicks was a 28 year old, hardly kn own
budding sta r at the time. Co nsequently, the th eory did not make its way out of university communities until th e 1940s and it is no t clear what Co ngress believed to be the
appropriate microeconomic th eory to use in evaluating the effect of an increase in wages
resulting from collecti ve ba rga ining.
Since the competit ive wage was not a we ll-understood concept , it is fair to believe
that the theory adopted by Congress may ha ve been more one of Co mm ons than of
Hicks . Common s, one of the great la b or eco no mi st s of his time, thought that unempl oyment wo uld be a co nstant problem a nd that , absent either government intervention
o r coll ective ba rga ining, the unempl oyed wo uld bid down wages until they were at or
immed iately below a li vin g wage (Commons and Andrews, 1927).
Until the advent of the m odern neocla ss ical theory of labor markets. there was little
supp ort for the notio n tha t society co uld be wea lth y enough to ge ner ate a derived
demand for la bo r that, in intersecti o n with labo r supply, wo uld generate a nd ma inta in a
socia lly acceptab le wage. Yes, real wages had ri sen substa ntia lly over time in the 1800s,
and took off wit h the industrial revolutio n. But a se ries of cyclical cri ses cu lmina ting in
the Great D epress io n suggested an unpleasant dyna mic story that capi tali sm was prone
to excess competiti o n which wo uld inev ita bly generate depress io ns a nd " reserve a rmie s"
of unemployed workers. If the Great D epression had been the story of the future, then
Co mmons rather than Hicks might still be taught in Econ 1.
The economic inefficiency of cartels was also large ly unknown at the drafting of the
NLRA. Showi ng that uni o ns may ca use unemploy ment in o ne ma rket does not necessarily pro ve that th e economy is worse off. Adam Smith (1 776) conject ured th a t that was
tr ue in 1776, a nd Leon Walras (18 74) develo ped th e initial theo ry for it (ifyou co uld read
French) ; but it wa s not until the 1950s that genera l equilibrium theo ry , and the pro positi o n that competition produced efficient res ult s, too k h old thr o ugh the works of Arrow
and Debreu (1 954) , Debreu (1959 ), and McKenzie (1 98 1), among ot hers.
A piece of the puzzle was still mi ssing, and tha t was the macroeco nomic analys is
o f cyclica l unemployment. Thi s was provided by K eyne s ( 1936) in the mid st o f the
Great Depressio n. What K ey nes showed and po st-Keynesians ha ve furth er deve loped
is that a co mbina tion of moneta ry a nd fi scal p olicies co uld dampen the severity of
bu siness cycles. Although the Real Bu siness Cycle model has ra ised questions abo ut
Ke yne sian theory and eve n the efficacy of monetary and fi scal po licy, the sta te of the
debate betwee n New K ey nes ian versus Real Business Cycle theo ries leaves po licyma kers
with far greater co untercyclica l to ols than we re availab le during th e Great D ep ress ion
(Mankiw, 1989; Abel, Bernanke. and C ro u sho re, 20 11 ).
The current macroeco no mic deba te has bo th the K eynesians an d th e R ea l Business
Cycle theorists agreeing upo n one critica l fea tu re o f modern bu siness cycles. namely,
wage rigidity. That n omin a l wages are rigid in the uni on sect or is n o t surpri sing. They
are a key fea ture of the co llective barga ining agreement. But wages also do not decline
during rece ssions in the no nuni o n sector, a t least since the G reat Depression (Dobrescu ,
2012)l 6
The finding of wage rigidity durin g recess ions in the no nun ion sector put s to rest
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co nce rn s rai sed by the old eco nomic grea ts like Malthus and Commons. Eve n during
a recessio n and a period of high unempl oyment market wage rates do no t fall. One
explanation for thi s wage rigidity is th a t firms a re less ri sk averse th an worke rs a nd
a re thu s willing to offe r in surance against inco me instability due to the bu siness cycle.
The other argument a nd the o ne adva nced in thi s chapter (see Sectio n IV) , stresses
that wage cuttin g is no t done eve n by nonunion firms becau se wage redu cti ons in
the face of declining demand is n ot a self-enforcing adjustment to declining prod uct
demand.
The up shot of thi s brief historical anal ys is is that. from the perspective of modern
labo r eco nomics, the theory ava ila ble to policymakers a t the time o f the passage o f
the Wagner Act in 1935 was flawed or n o t yet de ve loped. It lacked the microeco nomic
founda tions of la b or markets being developed by Hicks and others; it lacked the
fundamental welfa re theorems of general eq uilibrium theo ry; and it lacked a modern
business cycle theory . The Act's fear that ab sent uni ons there was nothin g th a t could
prevent recurring dep ressions was out of date by the la te 1930s, and there is nothing in
m odern business cycle theo ry to suggest th a t unions help to pre vent recurring business
cycles .17
Indeed prevailing economic o pinion had alrea dy moved away from thi s position by
the la te 1940s, when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, m oving labor policy from favo ring
uni onizat ion to neu tra lity. 18 Uni o ns mi ght so metimes be part of the proble m ra ther tha n
being part of the so lutio n.
Still. many labor law schol ars ignore the eco no mic effects o f uni o ns eve n th o ugh
the neoclassical model is so widely accepted in other areas of legal scho la rship. What
accounts for the widespread resistance to thi s co nclusion in labor m a rkets? One an swer
is the h o pe that a co mpeting th eo ry, th e efficiency wage theory, might be used as an
eco nomic argument fo r favo ring unio ns.
The heart of th e efficiency wage model is the idea that if you p ay wo rk er s a hi gher
wage the y wi ll wo rk harde r and be m o re prod uctive. It is, aft er a ll, a pla usible o utcom e.
W o rkers a re no t like a ny other comm odi ty beca use they can adju st their behavio r
to incentives . As a co nsequence, instead o f worker productivit y expla ining th e wage ,
the wage determines worker productivit y by providing incentives to wo rk more
productively.

C.

Efficiency Wage Model

The efficiency model can be viewed loosely as repealing the harsh predicti o ns o f the
in ve rse relat io nship between the union wage a nd uni on empl oy ment. In the labor law
literat ure, thi s has always bee n a favored line of thinking . The origin a l example of the
efTiciency wage m ode l was H enry Ford's decisio n to pay wages far a bove co mpe titi ve
levels in order to sec ure a m ore re liable a nd productive labor force.
The seminal efficiency wage m odel centers on the idea of a " gift-exchange" (AkerloL
198 4). The gift is a wage above the market-clea rin g wage. The ba sic theo ry is th a t the
worker unders ta nds th a t she is receiving a gift in the form of a wage a b ove th e marketclea ring wage . What is often neglected when scho lars appl y thi s m odel to th e uni on secto r
is the importance of identifying the gift-giver. If the gift is co ming from the firm. wo rke rs
reciproca te by becoming more loya l to the firm . putting out more wo rk effo rt a nd thu s
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beco ming m o re productive . W o rkers wh o are being treated we ll by their empl oye r m ay.
fo r exam ple. respo nd to a bu sie r th a n usual schedule by putting o ut m o re effo rt. The
co nve rse is a lso true: wo rk er s wh o think they are being bad ly trea ted ma y resp o nd by
putting fo rwa rd less effo rt.
T o see how the theory is likely to o perate it is u seful to desc ribe the paradigmatic
exa mpl e of the effici ency wage: th a t is. H enry Ford 's $5 a d ay wage . There are va ri o us
stories of the fa m o us episo de . 19 If one is to ta ke H enry F o rd a t hi s wo rd . which wa s cited
in the fa m ous case o f Dodge 1'. Ford lv! otor Companv. he in dicated: ·"' M y a mbiti o n ... is
to emp loy still mo re men: to spread the benefits of this indu stria l system to the greatest
poss ib le nu m ber, to help t hem b uild up their lives a nd their ho mes. T o do thi s. we are
putting the greates t sha re of o ur p rofit s back int o the business.'" 20 In thi s sto ry. H enry
F o rd is just a goo d , very rich ca pita li st who wa nt s to sha re pa rt of the go od fo rtun es of
th e co rp o ra ti o n with the workers ra th er tha n ju st w ith the sha reho lders.
The hi sto rically more gr o unded sto ry is more co mplica ted and less enco ura gin g.
H enry F o rd was one of the fir st of the grea t entrepreneur s o f the industrial age . H e was
ra pid ly ex pa ndi ng th e business to mee t a b urgeo ning dema nd for the low-cos t cars he
was produ cin g. This required a co nco mit a nt ra pid increase in em ploym ent. The pro blem
was tha t, in 1920, he was prima ril y hirin g wo rkers o tT the farm wh o we re unaccu sto m ed
to the di scipline and o n-time perfo rm a nce of manufacturing jo bs. W o rkers were o ft en
no t o n tim e o r strayed fr o m the assembl y line . Others ju st left to go back to the fa rm .
The $5 a day wage, which was ro ughl y d o ubl e the co mpetiti ve wage a t that tim e, was a n
attempt to reduce turn ove r and m a ke ex isting wo rkers m o re p roducti ve .
The $5 a day wage required no elaborate monit o ring. fo r if th e bo ss did n o t think
wo rkers were m eeting the stand a rd. they co uld be fr ee ly fired under the then and no w
ex istin g empl oyment-at-will r ule. In o ther wo rd s, th e effi ciency wage model requires th a t
wo rkers increase wo rk effo rt as a respo nse to the high er wage. The efficienc y wage is thu s
a n incenti ve sto ry. F o rd paid a higher wage, but the cos t o f th a t hi gher wage was o ffse t
by a m o re productive wo rkfo rce . Bes ides requiring no m o nito rin g, F o rd co uld se t the
wage a t wh a tever level he th o ught max imized profit s. The goa l o f the $5 wage wa s no t to
lose m o ney: it wa s to make grea te r p ro fit s.
H ow d oes thi s story play o ut in a uni o nized firm'? First. to stay faithful to hi sto ry, I
note th a t F ord wa s ve hem entl y a ntiunio n . The violence th a t erupt ed when th e Unit ed
Aut o W o rkers organized the Fo rd M o to r Company is we ll kn o wn in labor hi sto ry.
H enry F o rd hired a sec urit y fo rce that engaged in battles with union organize rs.
Ob vio usly, the creato r in real life o f th e efficienc y wa ge co ncept did no t take kindly to
having hi s facilities o rga nized. A nd tha t fac t is imp o rt a nt.
The efficie ncy wage sto ry simpl y d oes no t fit in a uni o nized co mpany. First, the
idea th a t wo rkers will wo rk ha rde r beca use the jo b pa ys be tter tha n their nex t bes t
j o b prospect depend s o n low-cos t mo nito ring. The effi ciency wage is itself an implicit
co ntrac t: hi gher wages fo r hi gher effo rt. F o r this dea l to wo rk , the co mpany mu st
be able to di scharge a shirking wo rker quickl y and a t low cos t. The efficiency wage
pa ys fo r it self by enc o uragin g wo rkers, who find the a bove-m a rket wage sufficientl y
co mpelling. to wo rk hard to keep the j o b , whether thi s mean s o n-time arriva l, few
a bsences . a nd n o shirking o n the jo b. Tha t mecha ni sm will be di srupted if the wo rk er
fo und to be shirking can m o unt a nd susta in a cla im o f un fa ir dismi ssal. Fro m the
worker 's sta ndp oint , the c la im makes sen se: fo r som e wo rkers ca ught shirkin g. it m ay
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have been a one-time lapse or the superviso r may have made a mi stake in rendering
the di scharge. The presence of a uni on wi th a grievance-arbitration process in the collective bargaining agreement protects workers from the se mistakes : but at the same
time it force s th e empl oye r either to engage in costly monitoring or to to lerate a certain
am ount of ··shirking. " thu s reducing the benefits to the employer that are promised by
the efficiency wage theory.
Second ... who ge ts credit'' for the gift'1 In collective bargaining, the gift-give r is the
union . After a ll. it is the uni on that fo ught for the higher wage . The press ring s with
stories in which un ion leaders claim that their gains were ··wo n '· a t th e bargaining ta ble
and had to be wrung out of the boss. The stories are quite plausible . H owever, for the
gi ft-exchange versio n of the efficie ncy wage theo ry to make economic se nse, the gift
has to be seen to co me from the employer, fo r it is the employer's willingness to pay the
ab ove- market wage that enco urages workers to be mo re lo ya l and grateful.
The efficiency story is alive and we ll , h owever, in many nonuni o n sectors of the
eco nomy. None of the eco nomic models of the efficiency theory sees the efficiency wage
as the product of collective bargaining where the parties can use their economic wea pons
to achieve the best co ntract for their side. To genera te greater efficiency to cover the cost
o f the higher wage. the efficiency wage is calc ul a ted based on offsetting the hi gher cost
with greater effort. It is entirely an incent ive device . Nonunion firms may pa y higher
than market wages, bo th to reduce their turnover and monitoring costs but a lso to avo id
uni onization .
Elements of the effi ciency wage model ca n be found in Freeman and M ed off in their
book What Do Unions Do ? (1984). They argued that higher union wages might encourage higher producti vity among workers by providing workers with a voice that could
affect the workplace environment. As a consequence of voice, workers might gain
improve ments in job se nio rity and securit y tha t wo uld encourage wo rk ers to pass on
skil ls to j uni or workers a nd to wo rk more productively in general. Free ma n and Medoff
provided little evidence that union s co uld rai se productivity high eno ugh to o ffset the
uni o n wage premium. The only empirical supp ort for the effect was provided by Brown
a nd Medoff (1978). Indeed Freeman and Medo ff ack nowledged that any positi ve effects
of unions on producti vity would probabl y not be sufficient to und o th e detrimenta l
effect of the uni on pay premium . Con sequ entl y, they argued that the gain s from the
good face of union s cou ld only be achieved by policy intervention such as amending
labor la w.
The vast literature on the subject of th e efficiency effect s of unio ns. much of it stimula ted by the Freema n and M edoff book, showed a negative rather than a positive effect
on producti vit y (a ltho ugh not statisticall y significant). This is summari zed in Chapter 4
o f this vo lume by Hirsch .
In sum , uni ons rai se pay, and consequentl y uni o n firms are at a cost disad va ntage
when competing with no nunion firm s. There is no d iscernible offset ting increase in
worker producti vit y. The great loss of uni o n emp loyment has been m o re than offset
by the growth in d omes tic nonunion employme nt. This is not a story about low wages
in emerging countries. Instead it is about the existence of a sizeable no nuni on sec tor in
eve ry American indu str y that is ab le to compete success full y with its uni o n competitors
o n the basis of lower labo r costs. (See Hirsch. C hapte r 4 in thi s vo lume.)
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UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET

T hu s fa r, I have stressed that the extern al labo r m a rk et is genera lly effici ent. The extern al
labo r m a rket is where indi vidual s sea rch for j o bs when they either enter the labor force or
leave their current empl oym ent , and where firm s loo k fo r new empl oyees. It is "external"
in the sense th a t it is o ut side of the firm. Wh a t m a kes the exte rn al la b or m a rket competiti ve is that firm s in num erous different indu stries are a ll loo king for entry wo rk ers
wit h generalized skill sets . A high school graduate could become a semi-skilled worker
at Ca terpillar. or at JP Morgan. or at a small firm. A college graduate could become a
managemen t trainee a t Genera l Electric or a web designer for a sm all firm . T h e wo rke rs·
ge neral skill s may be more or less specialized and better suited fo r so me industries than
other s; but they a re not firm specific. Hence these workers ca n wo rk in a range of industries or for any firm within the industry. T he sa me story can be told of the MBA graduate
who ca n be hired int o ma nagement at Caterpill a r or a t JP M organ , or at a sm all firm .
Once a worker is hired into a firm , she leaves the ex tern al la bo r ma rket a nd enters the
in te rn al la bo r m a rket (ILM). T he intern al la bor market is the relat ionsh ip between the
firm a nd its empl oyees . The ILM consists o f a se t o f exp licit or implicit rules governing
wages, promo ti on op portunities, grievance procedures a nd o ther term s a nd co nditi ons
o f empl oyment. In la rge firms, th e ILM can be highl y form a lized; in sm all firm s, it m ay
ba rely ex ist.
A.

Basic Principles of Internal Labor Markets

T he ILM co mes in two broad types: uni onized and n onun ionized. In the uni o n ILM . the
rul es governin g the wo rkplace are largel y a ma tt er o f ex press co ntrac t; they are written in
th e form of a co llecti ve ba rgaining agreement a nd a re enforcea ble befo re a n a rbitra to r,
a co urt or the N LRB. In the nonunio n ILM , the agreem ent s a re not contractual; tha t is,
m os t of their term s ca nn ot be enforced by a thi rd-pa rt y a rbitra tor or judge. R a ther. the
n onuni on ILM rela tionship is generall y one o f empl oyment- a t- will , and mo st of it s terms
a re subj ect to m odifi cati o n a t will.
Bo th types o f ILM s a re generally governed by simila r broad principles , whether lega ll y
enforceable or n ot. M os t hiring takes place a t entry-level j obs which connect the ILM
to the ELM . Based on perfo rmance or j ob tenure, wo rke rs can then be prom oted int o
higher level j o bs. Earnings typicall y ri se with job tenu re . In a product market decline.
adju stment s are typically mad e by reducin g ho urs or laying ofT worker s rather th an by
reducing wages; a nd res ulting la yoffs or di scha rges ge ne rall y a re inversely related to
seni orit y. The diffe rence between the uni on and no nuni on ILM s is that these characteristics a re co ntractuall y ma nda tory in the uni o n ILM. whereas they are n on-mand a to ry.
frequ entl y foll owed norm s in the nonunion ILM .
Wha t is described here is a so mewh a t ideali zed versio n of a n ILM - or perha ps a
hi sto ricall y co ntingent ILM , such as that which existed at " blue chip '' companies like
IBM a nd A T&T un til the 1980s. Man y obse rve rs have desc ribed cha nges in the nature
of ILM s since the 1980s. characterizing th em as a n e ros ion or even a n outright collapse
of the lon g-term empl oyment rela tio nship a nd m u tual expec ta ti ons tha t a re ce ntral to
the idea lized ILM (St one. 2004). But none h as co n vinc ingly sh ow n th at ILM s functi on
anyt hing like ex terna l "spot" m a rkets for la bo r. So vve will st ick with the idealized IL M
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for analytic purpo ses, while recognizing that thi s overstates the difference o n the ground
betwee n ILM s and ELMs.
From a policy perspective there is a huge difference between ex tern a l and internal
labor m a rkets. Whereas ELMs are generally efficient because market fo rces discipline
the parties ex ante , there is no reaso n to assume that internal la bor m a rkets are efficient.
M os t importantly. whereas workers are mobile in the ELMs. they are less mobile in the
ILM s, in part because of the firm- specific training they undertak e. Conseq uently, market
di sci pline is muted in ILMs .
The analysis of ILMs began during the 1950s when Kerr (1954) a nd Dunlop (1958)
described th e institutional realities of internal markets. Th is pioneering wo rk did not
attempt to integrate the ILM as an institution into the ne oclassical th eory of labor
markets. But that integration has come about since 1970 as the efficiency aspects o f the
ILM were deve loped by Doeringer and Piore (1971); Williamso n , Wachter and Harris
(1975); Okun ( 198 1); and Freeman and M e d o n~ (1984). The ILM is thu s no newcomer
to neoclassical labor economics. It ha s been an integral part of lab o r economics fo r over
30 yea rs.
B.

Relationship between Internal and External Labor Markets

An imp o rtant feature for bo th the union and the nonunion ILM is the manner in which
they co nn ect with the ELM . A s noted , the ELM is differentiated in wo rk er skill s largely
by the amount of education workers have received , and workers are hired into the ILM
at entry-level jobs. This is true for all levels of education, though th e p o rts of entry differ.
Upon hiring. workers receive job- specific or firm-specific training, which enables them to
m ove up the promotion ladder. Employees ten d to receive higher wages based on seniorit y and the amount of specific training they have undertaken . Hourl y p ay tend s to tluctua te little ove r the business cycle . Instead, the stage of the bu siness cycle is manifested in
ho ur s worked.
Whereas th e market discipline of the ELM controls entry wages for entry-level jobs,
it ha s only indirect control over the great variety ofjobs filled by internal promotions in
the ILM s. O ve r the innumerable job titles that exist in the United States eco nomy, very
few are determined so lely by the ELM . Yet the ELM does di scipline all the ILM jobs
beca use employees always have the right to quit and are likely to d o so ifj o b opportunitie s are more favorable at other firms. As expected, job turno ver is high er fo r workers
with little job tenure since starting over with a new employer typicall y m ea ns starting at
that firm 's entry-leve l po sition and entry pay ; that usually represents a significant loss for
m ore se nior workers. Since young entry-level workers are mobile, they are likely to earn
a marke t-ba sed wage , while the older, less mobile workers are vulnerable because market
di scipline imposes little direct constraint on the employer.
Nevertheless, the external market s matt er a great deal in controlling the pay and
working conditions in internal lab o r markets. Few workers need to be mobile. A s is true
in economics generally, it is the worker on the margin of stay vers u s quit who wields
intluence. The wo rker on the margin will have the best information o n alternative j o b
opp o rtunitie s and is likely to share it with o ther workers. The empl oyer who se ILM is
inconsistent with the relevant ELMs , in terms of wages , benefit s a nd o ther terms and
co nditi o ns of empl oy ment, will not be able to hire a nd retain a qualified wo rkforce .

Neoclassical labor economics
With th e exception of wages, benefit s, and other terms of co nditi ons of empl oyment
em ployers retain discretio n over othe r matte rs whet her th e firm is unioni zed o r not.
Emp loyers retain broad d iscretion , for example, to choose the firm' s techn ology and
to co nstruct job description s in accordance wit h that techn ology. Virtua lly all product
market decisio ns are decided unil atera ll y by the employe r. Relations with the firm's
o ther stakeholde rs are also typ ica lly de termined by the employer witho ut any input from
employees.

C.

Four Central Economic Factors that Affect the ILM

The ILM has four foundat io nal factors that d istinguish it from ELMs and that crea te
potential inefficiencies: fi rm- specific training, ri sk avers ion. asymmetric info rm at io n and
transaction cos ts.-' 1

1.

Firm-specific training

Firm-specific training is the core rationale for lo ng-term attachments and thus for the
ILMs (Wac hter a nd Wright, 1990). Withou t firm- speci fic training. there would be no
advan tage to the firm in retaining a c urrent em ployee as compared to hiring a new
empl oyee each day. Firm-specific trainin g makes wo rkers more va lu a ble to their current
empl oyer than to o ther employe rs. The resu lt is a wedge o r surp lus between their value
to th eir current employer versu s their value in the ELM. When thi s surplu s is shared
between the firm a nd the empl oyee, the fir m has a n incentive to retain workers with
j o b-specific training a nd wo rkers have a simila r ince ntive to stay with the emp loye r.
The surplu s from firm-specific training is a lso perhaps the m os t impo rta nt sin gle factor
enab lin g firm s to pay efficiency wages or wages above co mpetiti ve levels.
The problem is that, while the emplo yer and empl oyee a re di sciplined initiall y by the
usua l ELM forces, firm -specific invest ments in tra ining create a lock-in beca use the
in ves tm ents are sunk and have no va lu e o ut side of the match. T hi s creates a b ila teral
monopoly bargaining situa ti o n and the prospect of ineffi cie nt rent- seeking as each party
attempt s to take more of the surplu s than m igh t ha ve been agreed to. This lock -in is a
clear break with co mpeti tive markets th a t require that wo rkers be mobile. The ILM ca n
thus be efficient, where the surplu s is made as large as possible by coope rative behavior,
o r it ca n be reduced o r eliminated by adve rsa ri a l behavior. A lth o ugh the parties ha ve
a n ince nti ve to maximize the size of the surplu s, there is no market mech a ni sm that
guara ntees this beha vio r. Conseq uen tl y. the ILM is vulnera ble to market fa ilures.
Ironically, for th ose who identify the C hicago School with the ass umpti on of perfectly
competiti ve markets, th e lock-i n problem created by ILM s was o rigina ll y identified by
so me of the greats of th e C hicago School; namely, Becker (1964 ), Mincer ( 1962) a nd Oi
(1 962), among o thers.
The nature of the market fa ilure is easily described. If the par ties cou ld tru st each o ther
and prevent rent-seeking, eac h wo uld have an incentive to make the op tim a l leve l of
in vest ment in the relation ship . H owever. each party ha s an incentive to act opportu ni stically o nce the tra ining is completed . The ince nti ve to act oppo rtunistically is great if the
costs of the investment a re n ot sh ared. Suppose. fo r exa mple, th a t the employer co uld
ge t the emplo yees to bear a ll the training costs . Once trained , the e mpl oyees wo uld be in
a vuln erable posi ti on. The employer could attempt to divert a lm os t the en tire surplu s to
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itself by threatening to fire the workers unless they accepted a minimal return. Pu shed
against the wall, the employees would have little choice but to remain with the employer
and take any wage above the market wage paid in the ELM. H ence, the employer ha s
a potential gain from acting oppo rtuni stically. Similarly, if the employer paid the entire
training costs vvith the expectation of getting all of the re sulting surplus , the employees,
once trained, could threa ten to quit unless the employer agreed to give up its ret urn o n
the joint inves tment. Pushed against the sa me wa ll , the emp loyer wo uld be w illing to take
a very low return on its inves tmen t if the workers agreed to stay. because it could not
sec ure equally productive emp loyees on the ex ternal market.
In the face of the ri sk th at opportuni stic behavior might undo th e mutual gains from
inves tment in firm-specific training, the parties can develop self-en fo rcing norms that
preve nt opportunistic rent-seeking. 22 The key characteristic of the self-enfo rcing n orm or
cont ract was described by Becker (1964). Becker ' s solutio n was for the empl oyer a nd the
employee to share in the costs of the in ves tment. In a simple model with one empl oye r
and o ne employee , the cost sha ring would create an incentive -compatible co ntract where
the incentive for oppo rtunistic behavior might be elimina ted. Cost-sharing ta kes t he
form of a '' training wage" that is lower than what the employee could earn in an ELM
without job-specific training, but higher than the employee's current productivity which
is very low as he first acquires specific tra ining. With the current costs shared , the p ayo ff
for bo th parties wo uld come after the tra ining is complete. In this case, the employer
would have no incentive to fire the worker and the worker would have no incentive to
quit because each wou ld only receive a ret urn on their investment if the relatio nship were
maintained .
Unfortunately, a threat of employer opportunism rem a ins even if the job in ves tment
costs are sha red. Assume there are a number of employees. If the workers are n ot o rganized and cannot act in concert, the employer could pick o ff one v ulnerable empl oyee at
a time, and threaten to fire the employee absent a wage reducti o n. For each indi vidual
worker, the threat to fire that worker is real because the employer might secure its
expected return o n the joint inves tment from the continued employment of the o ther
workers. Each worker could be put individually in that position , a nd would bo th sta y
o n the job and accept a lower wage, as long as the empl oye r allows the worker to rece ive
so me benefit fr om the investment. That is, workers are better otT by no t quitting as long
as they are paid any premium. however small, over the wage available in the ELM.
Since each wo rker believes th a t the others will be offered the same ba rgain , each wo rker
knows that quitting is sub o ptimal. Hence, the employer ca n successfully act oppo rtunisticall y b y getting the employees to accept a lower, th o ugh still positi ve, return o n their
in ves tment.
This inequality in bargaining power is reduced if the workers can act in concert by
beco ming uni onized. F o rced to deal with the workers as a sin gle unit , the employer's
threat to fire the workers does not ring true becau se the threa t wo uld also cause th e
emplo yer to lo se whatever it invested in the relation ship . One of the impo rtant rationale s for labor unions is that they can pro tect workers from opportunistic beha vior by
emp loyers who might otherwise see k to divert the p o rtion of the surplu s that belongs to
wo rkers.
Ca n the same res ults be achieved without a uni o n? Arguably they can. Wh ere the
empl oyment rela ti o n ship is ongo ing o r where the employer mu st reg ul a rl y hire wo rkers
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in th e ELM , th e sharing of costs can be a self-enforcing norm . If the employer and its
empl oyees need to make ongoing in ves tment s in their relati onship, empl oyer opportunism in the initia l peri od will discourage th e employees fr om agreeing to the second set
of in vestment s. Hence, repea t play red uces the potential for opportunism. Similarl y.
if the employer must return to the ELM to hire additional workers, the employer's
concern for its reputation will deter it from behavin g opportunisti ca lly: otherwise it will
be difficult to hire new em ployees or to get these employees to in vest in their relationshi p. Consequentl y, the impo rtance to the employer of reta ining a re putati on for fa ir
play, both externall y and within an ongoing relationship. can make the arrangement
se lf-enforcing. The self-enforc ing feature of the arra ngeme nt will be grea test, o bviously,
where both a re present - the empl oyer needs to return reg ularl y to the ELM a nd the
re la ti onship with each empl oyee is ongo ing (or repeat-play).
The opti on to uni onize provides addi tional protecti on against op portunism by a nonuni on employe r. As noted a bove, the evide nce is over whelming that controlling for skilL
job tenure, edu ca ti on, demographics, and locati on, uni onized wo rkers are paid more
than co mparab le nonunio n wo rkers. This sugges ts th at, in the unio nized wo rk place , a
la rge sha re of the investment in firm- specific training is paid for by the employer in the
form of ab ove-ma rket wages. G iven the higher labor cos ts assoc ia ted with a uni oni zed
labor force, it may not be necessary for the nonunion wo rkers to ac tually form a union,
for th e eve r-present threat o f unioniza ti on can be pa rticul arl y effective in di sco uraging
empl oyer opportunism.
Ironicall y, altho ugh the uni on sec tor is stru ggling due to nonunion competition, the
nonunion sector has benefitted fr om th e ex istence of the uni on sector because of a deterrent effect on nonunion empl oyers wh o might otherwise act opportunistically if not for
the fear of bein g uni onized .
2. Risk aversion
If the parties to the employment rel ati onship we re ri sk neutraL th e great bulk of pay
as well as promoti ons wo uld be strictl y performa nce based. That is becau se pay-forperformance creates the grea test incenti ves for employees to work a t their highest level
of perfo rmance, and is therefore wealth maximizing. The evidence, however, is that
wo rkers are more risk ave rse than are employers. Tha t is, employees prefer to receive a
sta ble income, rather than a n amount th a t va ri es with the fortunes of the firm , even if the
va ria ble pay has a higher ex pected value th a n the steady stream . This risk ave rsion may
be a fun cti on of employers· better access to fin ancial markets to smooth out the consequence of reve nue lluctuati ons: but it simply may be due to th e fact tha t workers don't
like fluctu a tions in their income. Stable does not mea n constant; in fact, workers tend to
prefer a steadil y ri sing wage pro fil e. Tha t is, wo rk ers make more in ves tment s in the form
of reduced inco me when they are yo un ge r, a nd rece ive the returns on th ose in ves tments
when they are older. The va lue of firm- specific in ves tments thus onl y partly explains the
widely observed fact that wo rkers· inco me tend s to be higher as th ey ge t older.
If employees we re not risk ave rse, the grea t bulk o f pay wo uld be performa nce base d.
Wage increases, bonuses, etc. would all be based on perform ance. Pro motion s too wo uld
be based on performance . The preference fo r pay-fo r-perfo rm a nce is that it is wealth
max imizing. It creates the grea test incentives fo r employees to wo rk at their hi ghest
susta ina ble level of perfo rm a nce.
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Almost all bu sinesses work to find the best tradeoff in their compensation arrangements between sta ble wages a nd the hi gh -powered incen tives provided by pay -for- perfo rmance. This is the sa me pro blem th at th e firm solves to determine the best efficiency
wage level. Pay-for-performance may take the fo rm o f stock op ti o ns or b o nu ses, o r it
may take the form of annual sala ry increases o r pro m o ti on s based o n performance . In
thi s regard. unionized firms tend to have the least a m ount of p ay -for-perfo rmance. This
m igh t be due to a greater distru st of employe rs, higher-than-n o rma l risk aversion, o r a
preference for min im izing pay dispa rities ac ross wo rkers.

3.

Asymmetric information
Ano th er important feature of ILM s is the prese nce of inform atio n asymmetries .
Asymmetric information exis ts in the ILM when it is rela tively mo re costly for o ne o f
the parties to obse rve or m onitor th e quantity and quality of wo rker input s. Although
the empl oyee is in vo lved in an o ngoin g re la tionship with the employer , the firm has
information advantages over emplo yees. In particul a r , the empl oyer h as superior info rmati o n abo ut the productivity of its workers . Remember that the labo r demand curve
depends on the marginal productivity o f the wo rker. Except in the unu sual case where
th e wo rker produces a good o r service fr om scratch a nd sell s it herse lf to the custo mer,
th e wo rker 's marginal prod uctivity wi ll be unobserva ble to the wo rker. The worker,
howeve r, has a n info rmatio n ad va ntage over another key item : na mely, the wo rker's
effo rt . Beca use m o nitoring is cos tly. emp loye rs can o nly es timate their empl oyees' work
effo rt.
One answer to the problem o f asymm etry of inform ati on has been provided by govern ment regul a tio n of the ILM in cases where employers ha ve a significa nt info rmati o n
adva nt age a nd the sta kes fo r employees are large. Tha t i'S the case for bo th workplace
safety and deferred compensation in the fo rm o f re tirement pay. Moreover, empl oyer
rep ut a ti o n may no t be a sen si ti ve co ntr ol in such cases becau se of the difficulty and
complexity in o bse rving existing safety conditions and deferred compensat ion, and in
separating out the role of empl oye r oppo rtuni sm fr o m changes in technol ogy or the
prod uct market. The pro blem of asymmetric informa tio n is reso lved here by government
reg ul a tio n in t he fo rm o f the Employee Re tirement Inco me Security Act (ERISA) a nd
the Occupational Safety and H ealth Act (0S HA). 23
Outside o f these areas where gove rnm ent informat io n fill s a n existing gap , what
expla in s the lack o f complex con tractin g to control o ther informatio n asymmetries m o re
ge nera ll y? The sa me questi o n can be asked about jo b-specific tra ining, which might a lso
benefi t fr o m con tracts that protect each party's vu lnerable investme n ts. The uni o n contrac t a lth o ugh lengthy, ha rdly covers a ll possible contingencies. In the nonuni o n sec tor,
th ere is no co ntrac ting at all. The answer to the existence of limited con tracting rather
than co mplex co ntingent claims contract to dea l with ever y contingency ha s to be the
tra nsacti on cos ts inherent in contractin g in the ILM .
4. Transaction costs
Transaction costs in vo lve the costs associated with writing and en fo rcing agreements
th a t govern the rela ti o nship between empl oye rs and empl oyees. As noted in the sec ti o n
above. the prese nce of asymmetric information leads one to expect complex con tin ge ntsta te contrac ts. As de scribed by Wachter and Wright ( 1990).

Neoclassical lab or economics

37

[s]uch co ntra cts would specify what happen s in the face of po tent ia l exogenous changes in technol ogy or in the demand for the fim1 's o utput , and hence input s. Combined with risk aversion
and match-specitic in ves tments, such contracts would a lso de scribe the parties' agreed-upon
tradeoffs bet ween inco me smoothing and the provi sion o f appropriate incen ti ves fo r correct
repo rting of asymme tric in fo i·mati o n.

This is no simple task; it would challenge eve n the best drafter of contracts. The term
"bounded rati o na lit y" can be used to de scribe the inabilit y of con tract drafters to anticipate all the pote ntial stat es of the world that might emerge. and ho w the parties should
respond to each particular sta te of the world .
Several factor s make co ntracting in the ILM pa rticularl y costly. First, man y jobs are
idiosyncratic to the ILM . Besides the large number of different jobs, workers within
the same job wi ll differ in their amount of firm-specific training. Second, the number of
interaction s is large. ILM contracts are not for a single delive ry of a product o n a date
an d time to be cont racted for. The em pl oyee's performa nce is continuous over the work
time and over the days o f employment. There is not o ne deliverable: there are many.
Third , j o b s are also interco nnected . One worker's perfo rm a nce affects the potential performance of workers who a re in the same team, the sa me office, the same assembly line,
etc. Finally , jobs evo lve ove r time, fundamentally with changes in techn ology. or in more
minor but continuo us ways with changes in product demand .24
The importance of transaction costs m a kes lab or and employment law central to
the modern theory of the firm. which begins with Coase (1937) and is elaborated by
William so n (19 85) . H art (1989) , a nd ot her scholars. In the theory of the firm, simpl y
stated, the firm fa ces " make or bu y" deci sions at every turn. Take the firm that makes
computers. It must decide as to each part , fo r example. the microprocesso r , the ope rating
system , and the keyboard. whether to make it interna ll y o r purchase it through suppliers.
Much of that make- o r-buy decision is based o n tec hn o logy, patents, a nd simi lar factor s.
For example. the firm will normally produce for itse lf computer parts ove r which the
firm ha s patent pro tection and ha s developed the technology.
In thi s decisio n-making process, a single question reappears: how easy is it to con trac t
for any individua l part or input? The prevailing view is that ho lding ot her factors constant a firm is likely to bu y in the market when th e input being purchased is standard
rather than idiosyncratic. It is likel y to make rather than to buy when the input is more
specialized or idiosyncratic. Al so, the firm is more likely to make rather than buy when
information asym metries are important. Info rmat ion a sy mmetries make third-party
enforcemen t of a contract difficult and error-prone beca use key fact s are not o bservable
or verifiable by an a rbitrator or judge. Finally, th e high er the cost of specifying terms
in advance - as in the case of repeated interaction s, interco nnected ta sks, and evo lving
tasks a nd technol ogy - the more likely the firm is to make rather than to buy.
All of these make/buy decisions turn on the amount of tra nsaction costs, which is why
transaction costs are central to the boundaries of the firm. What result s is the following
conclusion: bu y when the transaction costs of contractin g are lo w. When tran saction
costs are low, the parties can wTite a contract that is likely to be largely complete. Hol es
in the con tract will still occur wh en an unexpected event h appens over which th e parties
have not contracted. But, given sufficient ex istin g co ntractual completeness. the court
can u sually fill the hole by inferring a contract term based on what the parties themselves
wo uld have do ne if they had anticipated th e eve nt. On the o ther hand . if a n event occurs
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for which there are no relevant co ntract term s. the court will assume tha t the event is
o utside of the four co rners of the contract and is therefo re no t covered by the contract.
H ence. the theory of the firm reso lves a paradox that is created by the four factors
di sc ussed above. Specifically, the economic theory su gges ts that, with idiosyncratic
prod ucts (or, in labo r market term s, wo rkers with different am o unts o f job-specific
tra ining on tasks th a t may be unique to the firm) and high informa ti o n asymmetr ies ,
the parties have an incentive to wr ite complex state-contingent con tracts. Yet these ve ry
sa me factors th at contribute to high transacti on costs make the co ntract more co stly to
vvrite . more incomplete than complete. and hence more like ly to be subject to judicial
error. Co nseq uently. the theory of the firm provides a different an swe r: instead of using
complex state-contingent contracts , use no contract at all. Ins tead. " m ake"' rather than
'" buy"" by bri ngi ng tha t act ivity inside the firm a nd use the firm 's hierarchy to co ntrol that
input (Coase, 1937; Williamso n, Wachter, and Harris, 1975).
A transacti on cos t theory of the firm and the make/b uy di stincti on is genera ll y successful. One almos t never observes complex co ntrac ting inside the firm , whethe r in th e ILM
or elsew here. The firm might write simple empl oy ment contrac ts for so me executive o fficers or specia lized empl oyees; but these co ntracts a re usua ll y short and stra ightforward ,
and mostl y deal with the p ossibility of termin atio n.
The collecti ve bargaining contract is the one grea t except ion to the non-contractual
na ture of the firm . It is the only detailed enfo rceable co ntract that the firm writes to dea l
with act ivities and with actors that are who ll y inside the firm. Its policy implica ti o ns,
di sc ussed in the next section, are extremely important.

III . CONTRACTING IN THE UNION ILM
As no ted a bove, one way to deal with the co mplexity o f the ILM and th e potential
for op portunism is to meet it head on; tha t is, to write o r a t leas t attempt to write the
comp lex state-co ntingent co ntrac t that desc ribes each potential state o f the world that
might occur a nd , fo r each possible sta te of the world, what the parties wish to happen.
Bo unded rationality and the many contingencies that the parties to a n empl oyme nt
re lationship face ma ke that task impossible. But that is what uni on co ntrac ts attempt to
do. And that is why tho se contracts often run to hundreds of pages . Even so, they are
no tori o usly incomplete . The proof of the degree of co ntrac tu al incompleteness in uni o n
contracts is the number of grievances that o ften occ ur and the cos ts of reso lvi ng them.
These cos ts ca n include the fees of outside arbitrat ors, the time of lawye rs (o r managers and stewards) representing the parties, the work-time loss. and th e ill-will that o ft en
co ntinues beyond the co nflict's reso lution.
Beyo nd di spute resolution costs, h owever. a frequently cited cos t of uni on contrac tin g
is th e rigidit y imposed by the collective bargain ing agreement. All of the fact ors cited
above make rigid con tract terms expensive, especially in a world where there are constan t
changes in tec hn ology, competitive press ures on the firm , a nd the state of the eco no m y.
Fixed contrac t terms canno t be the low-cost answer to these co nditions.
Take th e seemin gly m ost easily resolved type of di spute: was the emplo yee's perfo rmance or behavior acce ptable or sufficiently below co ntract levels as to m erit the employee's di smi ssa!'l Each of the element s that make co ntract w riting difficult co mes int o play .
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First. wha t level of pe rfo rm ance is to be expec ted? J o bs a re idiosy ncra tic as is the am o unt
of specific trainin g underta ken by the emp loyee. In th e ex treme, standard s ma y have to
be set o n a n em ployee-to-em p loyee basis. Seco nd , the empl oyee's perfo rma nce m ay be
acce pta ble, even co nsummate so me of the tim e. whil e ot her times perfo rma nce is below
th a t cont emplat ed by th e co ntract. It is no easy task to wr ite a co ntract th a t defin es what
pe rce nt age of below-pa r perfo rma nces merits discharge . The third fa ct or, j o b interco n nec tedness, ma kes the task th a t much m o re difficul t. Was unsa ti sfacto ry performa nce
tr ul y the fau lt of the empl oyee o r did a no ther empl oyee's behavior, o r even the superviso r' s beha vior, lead to the unsatis factory perfo rmance') Finall y, how is the que stion of
discharge to be resolved if t he techn ology has changed to make the job more di ffic ult , or
if the prod uct m arket has declined to ma ke the empl oyee's perfo rm a nce less produ cti ve
even fo r th e sa me level of wo rk effo rt?
A ll of th ese fact o rs contribut e to making d isp ute reso lution d ifficult even fo r th e co re
questio n of wo rker perfo rma nce. The empl oyee m ay cla im th at her wo rk effo rt was high .
The empl oyer may co mpla in that th e empl oyee's prod ucti vity was low. Bo th m ay be
true in the co mpl ex ILM , where work effort and prod ucti vity a re no t o ne and th e same.
Even ap a rt fro m the difficult y of specifying the weight th a t eac h sh o uld have in judgin g
perfo rm ance, a pro blem is th a t the em ploye r ca nn ot eas il y determine the wo rker's effo rt
a nd the wo rker ca nn o t easil y determine her prod uctivi ty.
If thi s we re n ot co mplex eno ugh , a dd ye t a not her fac tor. Since effo rt a nd prod uctivit y
a re no t eas il y o bse rva ble a nd verifia ble, th ey a re subj ec t to th e pa rties' manipul a ti o n .
A t the m o ment of di spute resoluti o n. the neutra l a rbitra to r or judge mu st rely o n the
pa rt ies' represent a tio n s ab o ut the fac ts. Even if th e pa rties were ac ting in goo d faith , the
di sp ut e wo u ld be d ifficult to judge relia bly. If th e parties ca n m anipu late the dat a t o their
own a d va nt age with little risk o f detec ti o n , the task of reachin g the co rrect jud gm ent is
ve ry d ifficult indeed .
A no ther interesting fea ture o f th e uni o n ILM. to whi ch I have a lread y a lluded , is that
it ha ndles the tradeo ff between ince ntives a nd risk aversio n with a nea r pola r so lutio n .
M aximizin g the va lue o f the co rpora tion a nd ma king wo rkers as producti ve as possible
is bes t acco mplished by makin g pa y dependent o n perfo rmance. But in uni o n ILM s, pa y
fo r perfo rm ance is a lm os t entirely a bse nt. Pay increases a re based almos t entirely o n j o b
tenure a nd no t on perfo rm a nce; eve n pro mo ti o ns may be based la rgely o n se ni o rity. In
ad d itio n. the unio n "just ca use'' prov ision and grieva nce procedures mak e it ve ry cos tly
fo r the em ployer to pena lize wo rkers who a re underperfo rming. These two fact o rs a lo ne
- no extra pay for good perfo rmance a nd little pena lt y fo r poo r perfo rm a nce- su gges t a
very nega tive effect of unio ns o n firm producti vit y.
U ni o n prefe rence again st pay-fo r-perform a nce is part ly ideo logica l a nd part ly based
o n di stru st fed by asymmetric info rma ti o n. U nions typica ll y favo r na rr ow wage d iffe rentia ls o n ideo logical grounds . Indeed a genera l findin g in th e uni o n premium lite ra ture
is tha t the mos t skill ed wo rkers ge t the small es t uni o n wage premium, whil e th e least
sk illed receive the hi ghest premium . Distru st a lso pl ays a key ro le. D a ta o n p rodu ctivit y
a re avail a ble to th e co mp a ny, but no t the uni o n. Even if t he co m pany m a kes info rm a ti o n
availa ble to the uni o n , it cann o t be verified. If the pa rties are not in a rela ti on ship of tru st
a nd confidence, it is unlikely tha t they will agree to base pay o n info rm a ti o n th a t ca nn o t
be verified by bo th pa rti es.
An o th er facto r m a kin g th e uni o n ILM atyp ical in the co ntract world is th a t the
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relat io nship is no t a vo lunta ry o ne as far as the employer is co nce rned. Genera ll y, co ntract s a re entered into vo luntarily by the parties. Contract law serves as " the handmaiden
of the parties" and supplies a set of defa ult terms, m ost of which the part ies can change
vo lun tarily. Parties can res trict or expand the scope of the contract to fit their needs.
There a re few mandato ry terms, with the exception of an implied obligat io n o f "good
faith a nd fair dealing .. , Commercial co ntracts typ ically ru n for a limited term so that. if
the parties do have a falling out, th e contract can be terminated.
The co llective bargaining co ntract is also unlike any other commercia l co ntract. F irst
o f all. once a union is selected by a maj orit y of bargaining unit members, the company is
required by law to bargain with the uni on even if it prefers to bargain with another union
or with n o union at a ll. The employer mu st bargain in good fa it h over a set of mandatory topics, including wages, h o urs, and o ther term s and conditions of employmen t.
The parties can a lso deploy "economic wea pons" - the uni on can strike o r the employer
can lock out the worker s - to press ure the ot her party sh o uld they reach an impasse in
their bargaining. Although the law's goal may be peaceful labor relations, that peace is
achieved and punctuated by the use of these " weapons."
No ne of this is meant as criticism of the NL RA in terms of its overa ll effec t on the
econo my . In anot her chapter in this vo lume I argue that the NLRA was ju stified. and
has in fact been ex traordinarily successful. The argument brings in iss ues of political
eco no my tha t are beyond the scope of this chapter, but its main point is worth n oting
here. Before the passage of the NLRA, labor hi story in the United Sta tes. as elsewhere,
was filled with stories of violent strikes. At times revolution was in th e air. Only the
NLRA , and its natio nwide legitimizatio n of union s, collective ba rga ining, a nd peaceful
st rikes, was able to bring a close to th a t violent chapter of hi story.
Putting as ide th e social value of labor law, h owever, the uni o n ILM ha s elem ent s
that are clearly costly to empl oyers. Apart fr o m raising wages a nd benefit s above competitive levels, un ions also bring a bout a degree of forma liza ti on in contract writing a nd
enfo rcem ent th a t is inherently costly .

IV. ILM CONTRACTING IN THE NONUNION FIRM
Whereas the uni on sector takes o n the co mplexities o f the ILM b y writing explicit co ntra cts, the non uni o n sector does no t. This lack of contracting rai ses two questi ons. First,
why does the nonunion ILM d o virtually no contracting at a ll , ver sus, for exampl e,
so me contracting but less than the uni on sector? Seco nd, how can the nonunion ILM be
successful in mitigating or elimina ting the po tential for employer opport uni sm ')
Befo re a nswering these q uesti ons it is important to explain h ow I am using the word
"contract. " Econo mists use the term co ntrac t to mean an agreement by the pa rties,
which can be implicit o r explicit a nd is not necessarily enforceable. Indeed the question
o f enforceabilit y is not raised, nor is it of particu lar interest to economis ts. pa rticul a rly
since th e contracts a re o ften constructed to be self-enforcing. In thi s chap ter, th e difference between judicia l enforcea bili ty and unenforcea bility is an import an t di stinction. I
will use the term "contract," whether exp licit or implicit, to mea n a judicially enforceab le agreement. a nd I wi ll use the term '·norm" to mea n a mutual expectation th a t is not
intended to be judicially enforceable.: 5
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Wha t th en explains the difference between the use of enfo rceable co ntracts in the un io n
ILM a nd the almos t exclusive use o f n on-enfo rceable norm s in the n onunio n ILM '? A t
a theo reti cal leveL the an swer is given by th e th eo ry of th e firm di scu ssed ab ove . R eca ll
th a t th e bo undaries of the firm are drawn specificall y so th a t the ac ti vities bro ught inside
the firm are th ose where fo rm a l co ntracting is too difficult o r costly, a nd where decisio n
m akin g ca n m o re effici ently be d o ne unil a tera ll y thro ugh th e firm 's hierarchical stru cture. The uni o n ILM is the grea t exceptio n , in tha t the act ivit y is carried o ut inside the
fi rm and the em p loyees bargain co ll ec tively with the em p loye r a nd reach a n en fo rcea ble
agreement governing the employmen t re lationshi p (Dau -Schmidt 1992).
The imp licatio n of this d ivide is enormo usly important. If the transactio n cos t-based
th eo ry o f the firm is co rrect, the un ion ized firm h as a la rge co m pe titive di sad va nt age . Bu t
there is a big " if'' att ached to tha t pro p os itio n. In the la te 1800s, empl oyees wh o were
d issa ti sfied with their term s a nd cond itions of empl oyment wo uld , fro m time to time.
a ttempt to o rganize a uni on a nd engage in co ncert ed acti vities. Som e of tho se a cti vities
were illega l under state law, and the poli ce o r National G ua rd , or even the regul a r a rm y,
was bro ught in to subdue or cru sh th em (W achter , C hapter 15 in t hi s volume ). Indeed ,
th e m ost co m pelling rati o nale fo r the passa ge of the N L RA was to end thi s industrial
strife, which was ha rmful to the na tio n's eco nom y.
T he po int tha t can be drawn fro m the hi sto ry is that , prio r to the NLRA, the no nu nio n
secto r was a frequently d ys fun cti o na l o rga nizatio na l ty pe. Fo r the affected empl oyer, t he
cos ts of strikes we re just the tip of the iceberg. Disgrun tled empl oyees ha d many ways
to pena lize a firm if they chose to do so . Since m onit o rin g is no t a nd canno t be co ntinuo us, empl oyees in manufacturin g or co nstruc tio n, fo r exa mpl e, co uld harm the fi rm by
sab o tagin g equipment o r simpl y igno ring the need for repa irs. Alth ough documentin g
such ac ti vity is impossible. it is likely tha t even prio r to an o utbreak o f overt co ncerted
activit y, di sgruntled empl oyees had m an y ways to hit back a t a n empl oyer who was
acting unfa irly o r o ppo rtuni stically. This p oint wa s emphas ized by institutionalists such
as Dunl o p ( 1958 ) and K err ( 1954) a nd th eo ri sts like Becker (1 964) .
The milit a ncy of wo rker s in the ea rl y o rga nizin g drives of the 1930s and befo re a ppea rs
to retlect intense wo rker unhapp iness with the existing no nun io n I LM s of the tim e. It is
no surpri se that worker unres t esca la ted in th e D epressio n, given that empl oye rs have
grea ter po tential to act oppo rtuni st icall y during econ omi c depress io n s. thu s provo kin g
increased indu stria l strife.
Co nditi o ns seem to be very diffe rent tod ay. At leas t the extremely low le vels of strike
acti vity wo uld see m to sugges t tha t the no nuni o n ILM o pera tes with less o ppo rtuni sm
th a n in the pas t. 26 H ow does the no nuni o n ILM now operate so as to de fu se industri a l
unres t? At this p oin t, we return to the theo ry of the firm a nd the core co ncept th a t ac ti vities bro ught inside th e firm are b o th su sceptible to no rm-based gove rna nce a nd in vo lve
ac ti vities too costl y fo r effec ti ve co ntra ct enfo rcemen t.
The no rm-ba sed govern ance of the no nuni o n ILM is integra lly tied to the ju d icia l doc trine of empl oym ent- at -will (R ock and W ac hter. 1996). According to th e
empl oy ment- a t-will doctrine. "an em ployer ca n fir e an empl oyee fo r good reaso n , bad
reaso n, o r no reaso n at a ll. " Thi s d octrine can be criticized for a ppea ring to co nd o ne
empl oye r opportuni sm ; but thi s criticism entirely mi sses the p oint. T he p oint o f the
phraseo logy is to signa l a ju risdicti o na l bo undar y ra th er tha n a legal rule that is a pplied
in its litera l mea nin g (R ock a nd Wacht er. 1996). By stat in g the em ploye r's p rer ogat ives
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as broadly as possible, the employee who believes herself to be wro ngfull y discharged
cannot sustain a claim . The only exception is a worker who fall s into a policy exceptio n
such as race or gender discrimination, or illegal re talia ti on.
H ow can a legal regime th at allows workers to be discharged for "'no reason a t all " be
either fair or efficient? The answer lies in the reaso n behind the stark and unforgiving
language.
To understand that reason, compare thi s actua l standard w ith a counterfactual one
where the firm states that "it can lower wages for a good rea son, a bad reaso n, or no
reaso n at all. " The wage reduction rule is not se lf-enforcing, and an y firm adop ting it
would soon find it impossible to hire wo rkers and difficult to retain them . This rule
wo uld be entirely self-se rving and not joint profit maximizing . The rea so n is that a firm
can quickly raise its profits by reducing wages; but the increase in profits comes entirely
from the lower wages. Workers would obviously respond negatively to such clearly
opportuni stic behavior. Indeed, much of the industrial strife in nonunion firms of the
1930s arose when companies adopted just this kind of policy. Even though such policies were primarily adopted during seve re downturns in the economy, firms could not
convince wo rke rs of the need to accept the reduction s.
The underl ying reason for the workers ' distru st of a norm that a llows firms to lower
wages, even during a recession, goes back to information asymmetries: the firm's economic co nditi on is known to the firm. but not to th e workforce. Even if the workers
know that there is a recession and th at production has fallen, they do not know how
much of a wage reduction is merited. If the firm says that a 10 percent red ucti on is
needed, the workers have every rea son to distrust that assertion; may be a 5 percent
reduction would be sufficient to save the plant and the jobs at th e plant. The firm has
every incentive to overstate its problem to improve profits, while the workers have every
reason to distru st the firm. This is precisely why a norm of ''red ucing wages to deal with a
recess ion" is not an efficient, joint profit-maximizing norm. And, indeed, such a policy is
rarely used .27 In stead. the almost universal response to a reduction in product demand is
to reduce hour s of work. This is a n efficie nt a nd self-po licing no rm because the firm d oes
not ha ve a reason to oversta te its case or overs hoot the mark. If the firm reduces hours
more than is merited by the reduction in demand, o utput will fall and profits will suffer
more than they would with a smaller redu ction.
Employment-at-will is more like the self-policing norm of "reducing ho urs in response
to a recession., than it is like the inefficient norm of " red ucing wages." Discharging a
productive worker for no reason is counterproductive for the firm . It may lower the wage
bill , but the firm will lose the effo rts o f the worke r (who is presumably more productive
than the next new hire). The rational firm will not discharge a worker for no reason at
all becau se it will suffer in the product market. Hence , a norm of employment-at-will is
altoge ther different from a norm of lowering wages in response to a recessio n.
To many reader s, the idea that product market pressures ensure that the rational firm
wo uld n ot discharge a worke r for no reason might not be reassuring eno ugh . However,
there are other dynamics endemic to the nature of the ILM it self that tend to ensure
th a t norms work well. There is now an established litera ture de scribing the co nditions
in wh ich non-legally enforceable norms are a better choice for the parties than legall y
enforceable contracts (Ellickso n, 1991 ). Tho se conditions, as discu ssed below, are tho se
oft he ILM.
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A puzzle remains: if no rational firm would actually fire a worker "for a bad reason or
no reason, " what is the purpose of the language stating that they can do so'? The answer
is that the language is intended to be a signal to the courts: namely, it is intended to draw
a jurisdictional boundary that leaves a firm 's internal business judgments beyond the
scope ofjudicial review (Rock and Wachter, 1996). From a firm 's vantage point such a
jurisdictional boundary promotes efficiency by lea ving internal employment decisions
to the discretion of the firm . From a social welfare perspective the jurisdictional boundary is also efficient (p utting aside the reg ul atory protections offered to certain groups
and activities) because of the high costs and risk of error associated with adjudicating
discharge deci sions .
Suppose that the employer needed to prove ""just cause. " Monitoring is costly, but it
would be necessary if the decision were subject to judicial review. As noted above. it is
always more difficult to prove a point to a court than to learn the facts. Even flagrant
bad play such as theft may be hard to prove, but what about the more prevalent cases
where the employee does not perform well enough'' How many examples of poor performance would be sufficient'? How harmful does each incident ha ve to be to be worthy
of discharge for cause? The correct deci sion would require the judge to learn the norms
of the workplace and to sort through facts that are proffered by the firm , and that are
often not verifiable by the court. Job specificity makes these decisions even more difficult . In contract disputes. the value of the actual performance is measured against the
value paid. Idiosyncratic valuations make this ta sk difficult, but this is exactly the same
problem raised in the ILM where workers have firm- specific training. Market values of
the appropriate wage rate and productivity are not available.
If judicial review is contemplated. the parties in the ILM would have to write contingent claims contracts to cover the many different states of the world that could result.
The contract , no matter how complete, would necessa rily be highly incomplete, particularly as more time elapsed. Courts deal \vith incomplete contracts in two different ways.
When the contract is largely complete. the court may plug the gap with a term that the
court believes the parties would have adopted had they known of this exact contingency.
The more complete the contract, the better the court knows how a gap would be filled.
However, if the contract is highly incomplete, the court takes a passive stance, and will
typically rule that there is no contract for that eve nt (Schwartz, 1992).
The labor contract involving the ILM . no matter how great the ambitions of the
parties. is likely to be highly incomplete. A court faced with this type of incompleteness
is thus likely to say that there is no contract for that event. And that would be the right
response. By stating the employment-at-will doctrine in a form that amounts to saying
that the employer can do whatever it wants , the firm is simply seeking a judicial finding
that there is no contract. This jurisdictional boundary ensures that the courts will stay
out of di sputes in internal labor markets and leave the resolution to the norms of the
workplace.
Clearly there is still potential for opportunism in an employment-at-will world where
judicial enforcement is not available to employees . Recall that job-specific training
leaves both parties potentially exposed because of their investments in the match. I have
already discussed the potential solution to thi s problem above, but it is worth addressing
in somewhat greater detail. The key is that safeguard s against opportunism have to be
self-enforcing since legal enforcement is ruled out.
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The traditional solution emphasized in the neoclassical literature is reputational
effects. Most employers have to make frequent trips to the external market. Reputational
effects are the first constraint on employer opportunism. Employers with reputations for
treating their workers unfairly will find it difficult to recruit and maintain a qualified
work force. Even if employees do not learn about an employer's reputation before hire,
they will quickly learn it after being hired . Quit rates are very high in the first year of
employment. Newly hired workers have made few investments in the job and lose relati vely little by quitting and searching for another job. Even firms with declining employment are subject to this check if they must replace some of their departing workers.
The second check on employer opportunism is that dissatisfied emplo yees can trigger
their rights to organize and bargain collectively, thus replacing norms that are intended
to be self-enforcing with legally enforceable contracts . This is a very powerful threat
given that the newly unionized firm may find its labor costs increasing sharply (assuming a standard union wage premium) . In a competitive, largely nonunionized industry,
unionization may be fatal to the firm. It can be argued, given low rates of unionization
in the private sector. that the threat to unionize is not much of a deterrent to employer
opportunism. Perhaps that is true, but an employer would have to be highly risk tolerant
to take that bet.
The final deterrent against opportunism is the self-enforcing norms themselves . The
literature on norms has identified the characteristics that are most likely to lead to successful norm-based governance (Ellickson. 1991). Workable norms are joint profit maximizing. Since they are voluntary, they have to satisfy both parties . If norms with this
characteristic can be developed, they are superior to contracts given the cost of contract
writing and enforcement. This is particularly true in contracting over labor relations
within a firm , where the frequency of interactions, the connectedness of events. and the
evolutionary nature of the relationship make it impossible to write even a moderately
complete contract. Fortunately, features that make contracting expensive in the ILM
context are very similar to the factors identified by Ellickson as likely to give force to successful norms-based enforcement, such as being part of a closely knit group. Therefore,
in the ILM , norms governance has the potential to be very successful, while contract
writing and enforcement will be very costly.
In addition, Ellickson notes that the ability to apply sanctions is an important feature
of norm governance. In the ILM, employees are empowered to apply sanctions by exercising their ability to quit, as noted in the groundbreaking article by Gary Becker (1964),
as well as by participating in negative gossip, which has become increasingly damaging in
today 's Internet world. The employee's ability to apply sanctions in the ILM to deal with
employer opportunism highlights the idea that ILMs are likely to generate self-enforcing
employment norms that can ultimately trump contracting as a method of workplace
governance.
The primary point of the theory of the firm is that contract writing in the ILM is inefficient. If it were efficient to contract over the terms of a particular activity, then it could
be left to contracting in the external market, which benefits from th e discipline and highpowered incentives of market forces. The ILM is internal to the firm precisely because it
is too costly to do otherwise.
The point is underscored by the rising use of ''outsourcing" today, vvhich amounts to
using the market to purcha se labor services. Indeed , outsourcing of the labor function,
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as an alternati ve to a uni on IlM , has become a major cost-cuttin g strategy, and thu s a
major profit prod ucer for ma ny firm s. Anything that significantly increases th e co st of
empl oying uni on la b or internall y (such as judicial imposition of hi gh co ntract enforcemen t costs) increases the attractive ness of o ut so urcing. The nonunio n firm ra rely finds
o ut so urcing attractive because its norm-b ased enforcement system is less expensive
th a n wri ting a con tract with a firm th at provides outso urcing la bor. The "make o r buy''
choice is a ve ry ac tive area for decision making today regarding labo r usage inside the
firm .
Hence, norms sta rt with a huge advantage ove r contract writing in side the firm.
Beca use contract writing and enforcement are so costly and difficult, neither norms nor
their enfo rcement have to be perfect ; they ju st have to ge t over that low bar to succeed.

V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
labor law and law and economics have not been close bedfellows. From one perspective, thi s is surpri sin g. labo r law is primari ly a bout nego tia ting a nd writing co llective
ba rga ining co ntracts, and con tract law quickly embraced law and econo mics when
Rich a rd Posner showed that important co ntract questions co uld be answe red by applying eco nomic contract the ory (Posner, 1973).: 8 Similar ly, la bor law is abo ut one of the
firm 's key inputs, la bo r, much as co rp ora te law dea ls with another of its key inputs,
capi ta l. Co rpo rate law fo und law and eco nomics to be useful fo r thin ki ng about relations betwee n the firm and its so urce s o f capi ta l, yet labor law remains resistant to law
a nd eco nomics.
The ex plana tion for the hos tility of la bo r law to law a nd eco nomics is apparent. First,
labo r law, unli ke many areas of law. is inhere ntl y norma tive. The Wagner Act was itself
pro-u nion a nd many o f its supp o rters believed that unio ns wo uld become the domin a nt
industria l rela ti ons sys tem . The law arguabl y became neutral betwee n uni on a nd non union indust ri al relation s systems after the adoption of the Taft-H a rtl ey Amendments,
but labo r law sch olarship retai ned its stro ng normative edge in favor of uni ons. M os t
labor law scholars believe that co llec tive bargaining is the appro priate mecha nism fo r
govern ing the empl oyment rela ti onship for wo rking men and wo men .
The clash with law and economics was bo und to be fierce. or at least spirited. The basic
find ing o f labo r eco n omics - uncontr ove rsial in eve ry o ther a rea of law a nd econo mi cs is th a t the quantity purchased of a goo d (e .g .. labor) varies in versely with it s price (e .g.,
wage). In la bo r law, such an asserti on is a ca use for ba ttl e, for it puts the ce ntral aim s of
the N LRA at odd s with each o ther . The N LRA 's goa l of equalizing bargaining powe r
wa s to be realized by workers j oining uni ons, and by uni ons rai sin g wages. H owever,
m ode rn labor econo mics teaches tha t if uni on wages are increased above market levels,
union emplo yment fall s. The goa l is thu s internall y inco nsisten t.
The uni on move ment 's hope was that wages were to be ta ken o ut of competitio n, so
th a t the collec ti ve wage could be hi gher tha n the m a rket wage . But thi s is un ac hieva ble
in a co mpetitive eco nomy with a sign ifican t nonunio n sec tor. l abor cost differentials
between unio n a nd nonunion firm s ma tter a grea t dea l.
Over the past seve ral decades, several attemp ts ha ve bee n made to con tr ove rt the co nclu sion that if uni o ns, thr ough co llective ba rgaining, force em pl oyers to pay more than
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the ma rket wa ge, uni on empl oyment will decline. The effici ency wage theo ry sugges ted
that if a n empl oyer paid wo rkers a n a bove marke t wa ge it could build a m ore loya l,
experienced . a nd p rod ucti ve workforce. But if the high wage is to be a gift th at calls forth
grea ter pro du ctivity. it has to be give n freely by the firm. In the co ntext o f collective ba rgaining, the union is seen as securing the gains for the wo rkers from recalcitra nt managemen t: so in uni onized fi rms, the workers· primary loyalty is likely to go to the union a nd
not the firm . T he efficiency wage story makes much bett er sense in the nonunio n la bor
market. where the gift of the high wage can be claimed by management. After all. the
etTiciency wage is simply another form of incenti ve payment which needs to be set by the
employer at the level where the cost of the higher wage is equa l to the productivity benefit
th at res ults fr om the hi gher wage .
T he empirical test of the efficiency wage claim for the un io n Ia bor ma rk et has produ ced nega tive res ult s. A pleth ora of aca demi c resea rch fo und no p ositive rela tio nship
between unions a nd pro ductivit y (H irsch, Cha pter 4 in thi s vo lume) . While u nions ra ise
wages a bove competitive levels, there is no o ffsettin g productivity effect.
T rad itional la bor law scholars have tended to view the neoclassical m odel to be
opposed to almost all policy improvements, even in the nonunion secto r. T here is much
to thi s position, but the neoclassical model it self does allow for a number of po licy interventi ons. T o begin with. mea sures tha t impr ove the fun cti oning o f markets (i.e ., th at
improve in fo rm a ti on fl ows a nd aid m obility) a re support ed by neoclass ical eco no mics.
M oreove r. give n the problem of asymmetric inform a ti on, m odern neoclassical eco nomi c
theo ry ca n supp ort policy meas ures t o improve occ upa ti onal health (e.g ., O SH A) a nd
th e security of deferred compensati o n arra ngements (e. g., ERISA) . Policy econo mi sts
might disa gree with each other as to whether specific regulati on s pass muster under
benefit- cos t a nalys is or whether the procedural element s are unnecessa rily cos tl y, but,
as a theoretical ma tt er, the existence of info rma ti on asymmetries can justify regul a to ry
oversight.
R eg ul a ti ons such as O SHA and ERISA, as well as the Fair Labor Sta nda rd s Act, have
a no ther feature th a t ma kes them accepta ble to policy-o riented neoclassical eco nomists:
becau se they appl y thr o ughout the economy, they d o not ca use cost di screpa ncies a mo ng
union a nd nonuni on firm s.
T he a nti-interve ntion tilt of economic a nalysis co mes bac k into fo rce when policies
a ttempt to improve the lo t of workers by providing m ore procedural right s, such as
res trictions on employment-at- will. H ere, tra nsacti o n cost theo ry is central. In particula r, third-p ar ty enforcement of procedural right s in side the ILM is very costl y as
described in this cha pter. Process is expensive, especially if it in vo lves third-pa rt y rev iew .
T alk is not cheap. thu s mandating m ore process is likely to lead to m ore out so urcing o f
the labor fun cti on .
A broad er qu estion is whether traditi onal neoclass ical a rguments miss the positive
redi stributional or welfare-enhancing effects of unions. This raises several co mplex
cla im s. One is th at , when labor union s raise wages, the effec t is redi stributi o nal towa rd
the bott om end o f the inco me di stributi on. Putting aside the empirical qu es ti on as to the
position o f uni on wor kers in the inco me distribution , neoclassical theo ry ha s a pote nt
res ponse. It tell s us that using unions to redistribute inco me is a bad idea. The fun da ment a l th eo rem s of welfa re eco nomics tell p olicyma kers to adopt p olicies th a t improve
efficiency and th en redi st ribute inco me through taxes and gove rnment expendi tures.
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Hence, even if unions have a positive effect on income distribution, those goals are better
and more efficiently handled by other policy mechanisms.
There remain , however, several critical areas for policy reform and welfare improvement s. The fir st concerns laws to combat discrimination or to give special protection
to certain vulnerable groups. Whether or not there is a strong effici ency case for such
laws - there may be for some and not for other s (Issacharoff and Scharff, Chapter 13 in
this volume) - th ey may have strong welfare justifica tions beyo nd the sco pe of economic
ana lys is. The second opening for reform is at the bottom of the labor market. In the
nonunion sector, employers are encouraged to play by the rules because of reputational
effects and the threat of unionization. But so me employers are not deterred by these
forces . Small employers and th ose wh o are o n a path to go out of business are not as
likely to be deterred, nor are employers who hire undocumented workers. For the se
workers, there is no back-stop even to prevent such core breakdowns as the nonpayment
of wages for wo rk performed .
A more fundamental point invo lves the distinction between normative and po sitive
analys is n oted above . Much of traditional labor reform is normative and a rticulates
societal va lues or what commentators believe the va lues o ught to be. Normative analysis
is not antithetical to law and economics, nor does normative analysis pro vide a critique
of the positive theory of the neoclassical model. The fundamental theorems of neoclassical economics, as di scussed in th e first sec tion. recognize the existence o f a social welfare
function , which incorporates societal values. Economists, as economists, have little to
say directly about the contours of the social welfare function . For example, many labor
law scholars favor collective bargaining as a goal in itself. Expressed as a societal value,
that is, as an input into the social welfare functi on, these positions are not open to the
po sitive critique of the neoclassical m odel.
At iss ue , however, is wheth er pro-unio n normative preference s are captured by the
political eco nomy that society ha s chosen. As stres sed in Wachter (Chapter 15 in this
volume), society's choice of a political eco nomy is more a political choice than an economic one. The neoclassical m odel takes the political economy or the social welfare
function as a give n . It s analysis of the positive or negative effects of union pay premiums
or o ther o utco mes takes place in the co ntext of the accepted political economy. Toda y,
the political eco nomy of the United Sta tes is highly competitive. Hence, it is at this level
that the normative argument in support of union s· traditional goals loses support. That
union s cannot take wages out of competition is a consequence of society's choice of a
political economy that stresses free competition.
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This foll ows th e introductory treatment of labor markets. See. for example, Parkin (2012) For an
intermediate-Je\·cl treatment. see Varian (2010).
5. T he neocla ssical model was developed from earlier classica l models that came to similar conclusions.
but in less complete or rigorous ways . Ad am Smith ·s (! 776) was the most well known. Thomas Malthus
( 1803) had a th eo ry of the labor market which predicted that wages would always be pushed to the subsistence level beca use of the inability of individuals to control their fertility. More central to this chapter,
Karl Marx ( 1867) had a theory that all value was created by labor an d thus could be returned to workers,
presumably in the form of higher wages . His theory was contested by Bii hm-Bawerk ( 1889 ). who believed.
co rrectl y as it turned o ut. that savings was a form of postponed consumption and required a return (i nterest) in order to occur . If there were no return for savings, there would be little savings and littl e cap ital.
The value of capital \\·as thus not embedded labor as Marx had theorized .
6. See Katz and Rosen ( 1994), sta ting the first fundamental theorem: ·'As long as producers and consumers
act as price takers and there is a mar ket for every commodit y. the equilibrium a lloca tio n of resources is
Pare to efficient. That is, the economy operates at some point on the utility possibili ties frontie r. "
7. See Katz and Rosen (! 994). stating the second fundamental theorem: "[P]rovid ed that all in diffe rence
curves and isoq ua nts are convex at the origin. for each Pareto efficient alloca ti o n of resources there is a
set of prices that can attain that allocation as a general competitive equilibrium ...
8. Labor econ omi sts are sometimes labeled as conservative beca use they di sfavor direct government
intervention in specific markets. This is a misguided labeling from my perspective. Such individuals
may well be very liberal overall but prefer that redistribution be ac hie ved thro ugh tax and expenditure
po licy .
9. In a recent st ud y Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom (2010) conclude that firms have some wage-setting or
mo nopso ny power due to imperfect information and job differentiation. Alth o ugh this line of research
is just beginning, the prevailing assumption remains th at. except in the very short run, the amount of
monopsony power available to firms is small and therefore unlikely to affect the co nclusions reached in
this chapter.
10. For a standard microeconomic treatment of the union sector see Pa rkin (2012) for introductory treatment. See Va ri an (2010) for an intermediate-level trea tment affixing wages o r prices above compe titi ve
le vels. Union pay or total compensation consists of both the wage and nonwage benefits. For ease of
exposition I use the term wage in place of tota l com pensation.
II. Cartelization , although descriptive in economics. ca n be interpreted as pejorative in law. Cartelization is
unlawful as a violation of the antitrust laws. Howeve r. the Clayton Act specifically provides a safe harbor
for union ac ti vi ty. Consequently, as a semantic matter. if cartelization indicates unlawfu l an ti trust behavior, then unions do not carteli ze the labor market. To use carte liza tion pejorativel y in the labo r co ntext
thus requi res <l separate justification for why ca rteli zatio n is harmful.
1:2. The Nationa l Labor Relations Act of 1935. spo nso red by Senator Rober t F. Wagner. is al so known
widely as the Wagner Act. When I use the term Wagne r Act. I am referring to the Act as o riginally
passed. When I refer to the NLRA, I am referrin g to the Act as amended , mos t importantly by the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947. popularl y kn own as the Taft-H art ley Act.
13. The decline in union employment was, of course. due to a number of fact ors. Fo r an acco unting. see
Farber and Western 0002).
14. The version of Prin cipii's of Economics used here was published in 1920: howe ver the original version of
the book was first published in 1890.
15. The version of Th e Th eory of Wages used here was published in 1963 : however it contains an o rigina l
reprint o f the first edition of the book published in 1932.
16. Indeed, altho ugh the economy has still not fully recovered from the financial crisis of 2008 and the result ing steep recession, arguably the wors t since the Great Depression. the evidence to da te is that wages have
not o nly not dec lined, rather they have also continued to grow (Daly, Hobijn and Lucking. 2012).
17. This is from the preamble to the Wagner Act: "The inequality ol' bargaining power between employees
who do not possess full freedom of associati on or ac tual liberty of contract, and emplo ye rs who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownershi p association substantiall y burdens and affects the
fl ow of commerce. and tends to aggrava te recurrent business dep ressions, by de pressing wage rates and
the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preven ting the stabi lization o f competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries ...
18. Moreover. between the passage of the Wagner Act and the Ta ft -H artley Act. influential commentators
such as Simons ( 1944) and Hayek (1944) had begun to question whethe r concentrated economic power.
even in the hands of labor unio ns, was socially benellcial.
19. See Henderson (2009) fo r a detailed description of the facts and sto ry behind the DOi(f!f r. Ford :Howr
Compunr case.
20. Dudg£: r Ford Morur Co .. 170 N. W. at 671.
:21. This section draws heavily fr om Wac hter and Wright ( 199U).
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The economics literature on self-enforcing labor market co ntracts is extensive. See fo r example
Carmichael ( 1989 ). Lazea r (2000). and Gib bons ( 1998)
13. See fo r example Eh renberg ( 1989) fo r a discussion of these issues.
See Wi lliamson. Wachter. and Har ris (197 5) for a broader discuss ion of transaction costs in the ILM
24
and the use of the term bounded rationality to desc ri be the difficulty of writing detailed contingent -state
con tract s.
Block ·s L,nv Dicrionwy (8th ed .. 2004. p. J41) de fines a contract as ··an agreement between two or more
25
parties creating ob ligations tha t are enforceab le or ot herwise recogn izable at law.··
26. St on e (2004) disagrees, claiming that. in the digital age. workers are exposed to a host of new cha llenges
and insecurities. and thus uni onism is more important now than it has e1·er been. Howewr. the problem
is that ttnionism itself has ye t to ada pt to this new era .
Wage rigidit y refers specifically to wage rates . Workers who also rece ive bonuses or any other form o f pay
for performance will find their income vary in g with the size of the bonus or ot her pay for performa nce.
As expected from the theory. fo r bonuses to work wel l the y have to be based on informati on observable
by the workers. A common technique is to base bon uses on firm -level income o r o ther measures tha t are
requi red as part of the firm·s fede ral filing req uirements under the Securities Exc han ge Act of 1934 as
amended.
28. The first edi tio n of Posner's Economic Analrsis of Lm•· 11·as published in 1973. The latest edition is the
eighth. which was published in 2011.
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